Articles Posted in Discovery

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After plaintiff, McAirlaids, requested the deposition of one of Kimberly-Clark’s (“K-C”) in-house litigation counsel, K-C filed a motion for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to preclude the deposition of its in-house counsel, Vicki Margolis (“Margolis”), who is an active member of its trial team. Counsel for McAirlaids requested the deposition of Margolis largely because she sent and received indemnification correspondence with K-C’s manufacturer, Beijing Beishute (“BB”), which McAirlaids asserted was highly relevant to the case.
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Dell moved to compel the production of certain internal counsel communications at the plaintiff, MLR. MLR had refused to produce the documents, claiming work product protection.

As explained by the district court, “[i]n the circumstances presented here, which are the result of MLR’s choices, the established policies underlying the work product doctrine require that the phrase ‘in anticipation of litigation’ in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) be limited, with respect to non-opinion material, to material generated solely with respect to MLR’s relationship with a particular potential licensee/defendant beginning at the time that potential licensee/defendant is identified. Other or more general relationship to litigation will render the material presumptively business-related and not protected.”
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Following the district court’s previous order granting a motion to compel against Fujitsu, and Fujitsu’s unsuccessful appeal to the Federal Circuit, the district court ordered sanctions in the form of a civil penalty. As the district court explained, the civil penalty was designed to provide an incentive to motivate the Fujitsu Entities to comply with the district court’s orders.

The district court was less than impressed with Fujitsu’s response. “After stalling for months following Judge Cole’s 7/25/2014 order with meritless objections, overruled by this court on 8/19/2014, and an even more meritless mandamus attempt denied by the Federal Circuit yesterday, Fujitsu’s counsel cavalierly concludes ‘Fujitsu’s Response’ with ‘Fujitsu expects to have the translations ready for production by Friday, October 10, 2014.’
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In Norman IP Holdings v. TP-Link Technologies, Co., et al., the Defendants moved to stay the litigation pending completion of an inter partes review involving the patents-in-suit. The plaintiff did not respond to the motion. Thereafter, the court granted the motion and stayed the litigation pending completion of the IPR involving claim 6 of the ‘597 Patent.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges ADTRAN infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 5,502,689 (the “‘689 Patent”), 5,530,597 (the “‘597 Patent”), and 5,592,555 (the “‘555 Patent”). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts claims 5 and 6 of the ‘689 Patent, claims 1-6, 10, and 11 of the ‘597 Patent, and claims 10, 12, and 51 of the ‘555 Patent against ADTRAN, the sole remaining defendant at the time the court decided the stay motion. The court noted that there have been 10 petitions for post-grant review of the three patents asserted by Norman. A total of 33 separate claims from the asserted patents have been canceled in the four proceedings that have been completed. The remaining six proceedings were pending at the time of the filing. In concurrent litigation, Norman alleged Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”) infringes the same asserted claims of the ‘689 and ‘597 patents. Nissan filed a petition for IPR as to claim 6 of the ‘597 patent and claims 5 and 6 of the ‘689 patent. On September 23, 2014 PTAB granted Nissan’s petition for IPR as to the asserted claims in the ‘689 and ‘597 patents. During the October 7, 2014 hearing ADTRAN agreed, if the court granted a stay of the present litigation, “to be estopped as to invalidity contentions raised and adjudicated in the [Nissan] IPR proceedings.”
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In this patent infringement action, the district court granted a motion to compel filed by Tellabs against Fujitsu. Fujitsu then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Federal Circuit to overturn the decision of the district court.

The Federal Circuit promptly denied the writ of mandamus as Fujitsu had to establish a “clear and indisputable” right to relief and that it “lack[ed] adequate alternative means to obtain the relief” that it sought. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
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In GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, GSI filed a petition seeking covered business method patent review of U.S. Patent No. 8,346,894 relating to “facilat[ing] real-time two-way transactions, as opposed to deferred transactions, e.g., e-mail.” CBM2014-00101. The Petitioner filed its petition seeking invalidity based on lack of written description, lack of enablement, indefiniteness and obviousness. On October 7, 2014, the Board denied the CBM review finding that the petitioner failed to establish that the claimed inventions were not technological inventions under 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). Notably, the Board’s decision was made without any briefing from the patent owner on this issue, who elected not to file a preliminary response.

In reaching its decision to deny CBM review, the Board rejected the petitioner’s argument that the ‘894 patent does not recite a technological invention because “claim 2 recites only known technologies, such as a processor, a machine readable storage device, a signal, an application, a network, the Web, an object, and a data structure.” The petitioner further argued that the ‘894 patent recites a combination of structures that achieve normal, expected and predictable results by “allowing a user to complete from a Web application the types of transactions he or she can already perform in person.”
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In this patent infringement action brought by Trustees of Boston University (“BU”), BU alleged that defendants infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (the “‘738 Patent”), which centers on light emitting diodes (“LEDs”) and the technology behind them. BU moved for an order compelling defendant Epistar Corporation (“Epistar”) to designate new Rule 30(b)(6) deponents on certain deposition topics.

As explained by the court, Rule 30(b)(6) requires the noticing party to describe the topics of examination with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). If the noticing party does not describe the topics with sufficient particularity or if the topics are overly broad, the responding party is subject to an impossible task. McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Kansas 2008). To avoid liability, the noticed party must designate persons knowledgeable in the areas of inquiry listed in the notice. Id. Accordingly, if the noticed party cannot identify the outer limits of the topics noticed, compliant designation is not feasible. Id.; see also Newman v. Borders, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009).
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In Trulia, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., Trulia filed a petition seeking covered business method review of U.S. Patent No. 7,970,674 relating to automatically determining a current value for a real estate property. CBM2013-00056. On March 10, the Board instituted a trial on the ‘674 patent and set a hearing date of November 19, 2014. On July 28, 2014, the Parties publicly announced a merger, which is expected to close sometime in 2015. However, the merger is currently pending review by the FTC, whose review is dictated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act under 15 U.S.C. § 18(a). Under this section the initial waiting period expired on September 3, 2014.

In light of the merger, on August 18, the parties filed a joint motion to request to extend the dates by one year, but no less than six months in view of the FTC’s review and expected approval of the merger. The PTAB asked the parties to supplement their motion after the expiration of the initial waiting period. On September 3, the FTC extended the waiting period in a second request for information regarding the merger. On September 12, the parties filed a supplemental notice to provide additional information requested by the Board, including whether the extent to which the parties are bound by the merger agreement and an explanation regarding why the parties are unable to settle this proceeding in an agreement that takes into account the likelihood of FTC approval. Following the Parties’ submission, the Board denied both a 1-year extension and an extension of six months.
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In Microsoft Corporation v. Virnetx Inc., Microsoft filed a petition seeking inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 7,188,180 (“the ‘180 patent”) on May 19, 2014. The ‘180 patent was asserted in a complaint for VirnetX Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 6:07-cv-00080 (E.D. Tex. filed April 5, 2007) (“the 2007 complaint”), and a complaint for VirnetX Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 6:10-cv-00094 (E.D. Tex. filed March 17, 2010) (“the 2010 complaint”). The ‘180 Patent also is involved in VirnetX Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Docket No. 6:13-cv-00351 (E.D. Tex.) (“the 2013 complaint”) as well as other pending litigation, two inter partes reexaminations (one concluded and one pending), and a second, concurrently filed inter partes review.

The issue before the Board was whether Section 315(b)’s one year time limitation to file a petition after being served with a complaint barred Petitioner’s IPR in light of the 2007 and 2010 complaints or whether the time should run from the service of the 2013 complaint:

Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ‘180 patent on three occasions. The first complaint (i.e., the 2007 complaint) was served on April 5, 2007, and the second complaint (i.e., the 2010 complaint) was served on March 17, 2010. The 2007 complaint and the 2010 complaint were both served more than one year prior to the date on which the Petitioner filed the present Petition requesting inter partes review (February 4, 2014). The third complaint (i.e., the 2013 complaint) was served less than one year prior to the date on which the Petitioner filed the present Petition requesting inter partes review…As described above, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) states that an inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition is filed more than one year after the date of service on Petitioner of a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.

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In Coho Licensing LLC v. Glam Media, et al., Coho filed suits against defendants AOL Inc. (“AOL”), Glam Media Inc., Ning Inc., LinkedIn Corp., Rovi Corp., and Twitter, Inc. (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). On May 16, 2014, AOL filed petitions for IPR challenging the validity of all the claims of two of the three asserted patents, and, on June 17, 2014, AOL filed a petition for IPR challenging the validity of all claims of the third patent. Defendants subsequently moved to stay the above captioned cases pending the IPR. As summarized below, the Court granted AOL’s motion to stay and granted the motions of the remaining defendants on the condition that they agree “to be estopped from asserting any invalidity contention that was actually raised and finally adjudicated in the IPR proceedings.”
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