Supreme Court Category Archives — Patent Lawyer Blog Published By Patent Lawyer

Published on: September 14, 2026

After $9.4 Million Willfulness Verdict, District Court Grants Permanent Injunction and Attorneys’ Fees Based on Defendant’s Litigation Conduct

A federal district court in Texas has granted a patent owner a permanent injunction, more than $4.5 million in pre-judgment interest, and its attorneys’ fees following a willful infringement verdict. The district court based the fee award on the defendant’s litigation conduct, including its repeated reliance on a prior art reference the district court had stricken.

In SnapRays, LLC dba SnapPower v. American Tack & Hardware Company, Inc., Chief Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas resolved the parties’ post-trial motions after a May 2026 trial in which a unanimous jury found that each of the asserted claims of SnapPower’s patents was valid and willfully infringed by American Tack, and awarded SnapPower $9,423,533.52 in damages. The patents cover powered cover plates that draw power through prongs or clips without being hardwired.

On the permanent injunction, the district court found SnapPower “can readily demonstrate the four eBay factors.” The trial record showed that American Tack and SnapPower are the two major players in the powered cover plate market, that SnapPower entered the market first with a popular novel product, and that American Tack’s “own executive suite repeatedly stated in emails—emails it was reticent to produce in discovery—that it was eager to copy the novel product but was aware that SnapPower’s products were likely covered by patent protections.” The entry of American Tack’s accused products coincided with a precipitous fall in SnapPower’s sales, and because SnapPower initially sold direct-to-consumer, American Tack “had cornered the market with infringing products” by the time SnapPower approached large retailers. The district court found reputational harm in the market could not be adequately redressed with legal remedies because “[i]t is difficult to quantify lost market share, brand recognition, and customer goodwill.”

Published on: June 3, 2015

District Court Denies Section 101 Challenge to Patent Validity Where Claims Described a Specialized System

by Stan Gibson

Defendant Murphy USA Inc. (“Murphy”) filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity as to certain claim U.S. Patent No. 6,076,071 (“the ‘071 Patent”) and one claim of U.S. Patent No. 6,513,016 (“the ‘016 Patent”) on the grounds that the patents are directed to non-patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C § 101. In its motion, Murphy contended that “[t]he Asserted Claims, directed to an ‘automated product pricing system,’ cover nothing more than the abstract idea of changing prices from a central location using known electronic components, and are not patent-eligible under § 101.” Murphy also presented a chart of one of the claims to demonstrate why each discrete claimed “principle” is purportedly accomplished in a conventional manner.

The district court began its analysis by noting that”[p]atent claims enjoy a presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282. Beyond listing the claimed elements in a column entitled ‘Abstract Commercial Principle,’ Defendant has failed to articulate convincingly why it believes the ‘automated product pricing system’ of the Asserted Claims is considered abstract under the law. By evaluating Claim 24 of the ‘071 Patent as a whole, the court concludes the Asserted Claims are not abstract under the law.”
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Published on: June 1, 2015

Supreme Court’s Decision in Teva Does Not Require Federal Circuit to Review Immaterial or Improper Fact-Finding under a Clear Error Standard

by Stan Gibson

After an appeal to the Federal Circuit, Defendant Arthrex, Inc. (“Arthrex”) filed a motion to reopen the judgment under FRCP 60(b). Arthrex premised its motion on the argument that the judgment should be reopened in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015).

Plaintiffs Smith & Nephew, Inc. and John Hayhurst (collectively “S&N”) had appealed the district court’s decision to grant Arthrex’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. As set forth by the district court, under the case law in effect at the time of the appellate decision, the Federal Circuit reviewed all aspects of the district court’s claim construction de novo. The Federal Circuit ultimately reversed the decision granting Arthrex’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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Published on: August 20, 2014

District Court Grants Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment Motion after Supreme Court’s Decision in Limelight v. Akamai

by Stan Gibson

In this patent infringement action, FedEx moved for reconsideration after the district court had denied its motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s claim for inducing patent infringement. FedEx moved for reconsideration based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).

The district court first analyzed whether the motion to reconsider was procedurally proper. “Under Local Rule 7-18, a motion for reconsideration may be made on the following grounds only:

(a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.”
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Published on: July 23, 2014

Supreme Court’s Decision on Indefiniteness Constitutes Basis to Reconsider Prior Claim Construction Order But Does Not Result in Change of the Claim Construction

by Stan Gibson

In this patent infringement action, Defendant Lighthouse Photonics Corporation’s (“Lighthouse”) moved to reconsider the Court’s Claim Construction Order. Lighthouse argued three reasons for reconsideration: “first, Newport withheld discovery regarding its relevant prior art patents; second, a recent Supreme Court decision constitutes an intervening change in the law; and third, the Court adopted a construction that had not been advanced by either party until the reply briefing.”

The district court, turning to the first basis for the motion to reconsider, stated: “There has been no shortage of sniping and finger-pointing in this case, and the briefing on this Motion is no exception. The parties vigorously dispute whether Newport withheld discovery regarding its prior art patents: No. 4,756,003 (“‘003 Patent”) and No. 5,410,559 (“‘559 Patent”). The Court finds no need to wade into the quagmire over who withheld what, because it exercises its “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter, or revoke” interlocutory decisions. See Martin, 226 F.3d at 1048-49. Specifically, the Court finds that the presentation of two related patents, which were allegedly withheld by Newport, constitutes good cause to reconsider the May 7, 2014 claim construction order.”
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Published on: June 16, 2014

Supreme Court’s Indefiniteness Ruling Has Immediate Impact at ITC

by Stan Gibson

After a hearing in an Investigation occurred between February 24 and March 7, 2014 and with the parties having submitted their opening post-hearing briefs on March 21, 2014 and their reply post-hearing briefs on March 28, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge determined that supplemental briefing was necessary after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus v. Biosig.

Noting that the final initial determination on violation in the Investigation was currently due to be issued no later than June 20, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge pointed out that “among the material issues involved in this investigation is whether certain claims of the asserted patents are indefinite under 35 U.S.0 § 112.”
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Published on: June 3, 2014

Supreme Court Sets Forth New Standard for Indefiniteness, Requiring Greater Precision in Claim Terms than the Standard Long Used by Federal Circuit

by Patent Litigation Group

For over a decade, to show that a claim term is invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶2, the Federal Circuit has required that such terms be “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous.” The Supreme Court in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. has rejected that standard on the grounds that it tolerates too much imprecision. Under the new standard, a claim term is indefinite if it, instead, fails to define “the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”

The patent at issue, assigned to Biosig Instruments, Inc. (“Biosig”), involves a heart-rate monitor used with exercise equipment. Prior heart-rate monitors, the patent asserts, were often inaccurate in measuring the electrical signals accompanying each heartbeat (electrocardiograph or ECG signals) because of the presence of other electrical signals (electromyogram or EMG signals) generated by the user’s skeletal muscles. The invention claims to improve on prior art by detecting and processing ECG signals in a way that filters out the EMG interference.

Claim 1 of the patent, which contains the limitations critical to the case, recites a “heart rate monitor for use by a user in association with exercise apparatus and/or exercise procedures.” The claim comprises, among other elements, a cylindrical bar with a “live” electrode and a “common” electrode “mounted . . . in spaced relationship with each other.” Biosig filed the underlying patent infringement suit, alleging that Nautilus, Inc. (“Nautilus”) infringed on its patented claims by selling exercise machines containing Biosig’s patented technology.

Published on: June 3, 2014

Supreme Court Changes the Rules for Induced Infringement

by Patent Litigation Group

In the long-awaited decision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., the Supreme Court once again reversed the Federal Circuit. This time, the Court’s reversal involved the issue of indirect infringement. Specifically, the Court held that an accused infringer cannot be liable for inducing infringement under §271(b) where no one has directly infringed under §271(a) or any other statutory provision.

By way of background, Akamai Technologies, Inc., (“Akamai”) is the exclusive licensee of a patent that claims a method of delivering electronic data using a content delivery network (“CDN”). Limelight Networks, Inc., (“Limelight”) also operates a CDN and carries out several of the claimed steps in the patent. But, its customers, rather than Limelight itself, perform a claimed step of the patent known as “tagging.”

Under Federal Circuit case law, most recently refined in Miniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., liability for direct infringement of a method patent requires performance of all steps to be attributable to a single party. The District Court concluded that Limelight could not have directly infringed the patent at issue because performance of the “tagging” step could not be attributed to Limelight. In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a defendant who performed some steps of a method patent and encouraged others to perform the rest could be liable for inducement of infringement even if no single entity was liable for direct infringement.

Published on: January 27, 2014

Supreme Court Rules That Patent Owner Always Bears the Burden of Proof on Patent Infringement

by Stan Gibson

In a nine to zero decision authored by Justice Breyer, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Federal Circuit and held that when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee that the licensee’s products do not infringe the licensed patent(s), the patentee bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of infringement.

Petitioner Medtronic, Inc., (“Medtronic”) designs, makes, and sells medical devices. Respondent Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, (“Mirowski”) owns patents relating to implantable heart stimulators. In 1991, Medtronic and Mirowski entered into a patent-license agreement that allows Medtronic to practice several Mirowski patents in exchange for royalty payments. In 2007, pursuant to terms of the agreement, Mirowski notified Medtronic that it believed several newly released Medtronic products infringed the licensed patents and, therefore, Medtronic owed additional royalties. Medtronic disagreed and challenged Mirowski’s infringement claim in a declaratory judgment action. The District Court (for the District of Delaware) concluded that Mirowski, as the party asserting infringement, bore the burden of proving infringement and that Mirowski had not met that burden. Mirowski appealed to the Federal Circuit.
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Published on: March 22, 2012

Will Mayo v. Prometheus Be the Basis for the Invalidation of Broad Patent Claims and the Renegotiation of Royalties? Implications for Myriad gene case.

by Patent Litigation Group

In Mayo v. Prometheus, the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims directed to a diagnostic method were unpatentable, not simply because the subject matter of the claims was not novel or obvious, but rather because the subject matter covered by the claims was the mere application of the laws of nature – the discovery of facts of nature – and therefore not patentable on a more fundamental basis under Section 101 of the Patent Act.
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